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Beyond Federalism  
Estimating and Explaining the Territorial Structure of 
Government
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks
Abstract
This paper suggests that the basic distinction between federal and unitary government has limited as well 
as served our understanding of government. The notion that variation in the structure of government is a 
difference of kind rather than degree has straight-jacketed attempts to estimate the authority of intermedi-
ate government. One result has been the claim that a country’s footprint, not its population, is decisive for 
government. Analyzing data for 39 countries since 1950, and comparing our own findings with those of 
alternative measurements, we find evidence for the causal effect of population. This can be theorized in 
terms of a trade-off between responsiveness to soft information and per capita economies in public good 
provision.
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1. Introduction1
The structure of government – the allocation of authority across general purpose jurisdictions –¬ is a deep 
and puzzling phenomenon. Philosophers from Hobbes to Madison to Ostrom, and political scientists from 
Riker and Elazar to Lijphart have sought to explain why some countries are, or should be, decentralized 
while others are centralized.
Since the creation of the United States, government structure has been conceived as a basic choice be-
tween a unitary and federal system. A unitary system is one in which decision making may be decon-
centrated or even decentralized, but final authority rests with the center. A federal system, by contrast, 
disperses authority between “regional governments and a central government in such a way that each kind 
of government has some activities on which it makes final decisions” (Riker 1987: 101). Most importantly, 
regions or their representatives can veto constitutional reform.
Each conception is rooted in a coherent, but opposing, philosophy:
“The contrast between Hobbes’ formulation of the institutions of government and that formulated in the 
American experiments in constitutional choice suggests that fundamentally different approaches exist 
for the organization of governance in human societies. In the one, a single center of authority, the sov-
ereign, is designed to dominate the whole. Each unit, as a sovereign state, is fully independent of other 
units as sovereign states. In the other, no single center of authority dominates the rest: all assignments 
of authority are subject to limits” (Ostrom 1987: 22).
The unitary/federal distinction lies at the heart of our understanding of constitutional choice, and has pro-
duced a rich literature on political institutions, but it has limited as well as structured our understanding of 
government. It conceives variation among governments as difference of kind, rather than degree (Wibbels 
2005: 67). It has directed attention to variation among federal regimes, but has much less to say about 
variation among unitary regimes, and while it is highly attuned to constitutional choice, it is less informa-
tive about incremental reform.
1 Earlier versions were presented at the Conference for Europeanists, Chicago (2010), the Annual Meetings of the 
American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. (2010), the European Union Studies Association in Boston 
(2011); the Comparative Politics Working Group at the University of North Carolina, VU University Amsterdam, 
Free University of Berlin, Charles University Prague, Duke University, the European University Institute in Florence, 
Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, University of Geneva, Leiden University, Mannheim University, University 
of Pittsburgh, Salzburg University, and the IHS at Vienna. The authors are grateful for comments by participants 
at these seminars and talks, and would especially like to thank Michael Bauer, Pablo Beramendi, Tanja Börzel, 
Jonathan Hopkin, Simon Hug, Markus Jachtenfuchs, Charlie Jeffery, Bonnie Meguid, Jonas Pontusson, Thomas 
Risse, Arjan H. Schakel, Pascal Sciarini, Michael Stein, Michael Tatham, Sonja Wälti, and participants at a graduate 
workshop on multilevel governance, Free University of Berlin, December 2010, for helpful comments. We thank 
Emanuel Coman for research assistance; Catherine De Vries, Jon Kropko, and Michael Tatham for methodological 
advice; and Dawn Brancati and Arjan H. Schakel for sharing unpublished data with us. The authors are responsible 
for any remaining errors and inconsistencies. We are most grateful to Tanja Börzel and the Kolleg-Forschergruppe 
“The Transformative Power of Europe” at the Free University of Berlin for providing us with a stimulating intellectual 
environment while we were working on this paper. This project is funded by the European Research Council grant 
MLG # N.249543..
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One result is a disconnect between sophisticated case studies of federal regimes and relatively crude at-
tempts to estimate variation in government structure. Measures of government structure have struggled to 
impose continuous variation on a categorical distinction. One response has been to use fiscal data. However, 
as we explain below, the money a government raises or spends is a poor indicator of its authority.
In this article, we set out a measure of regional authority and apply this to intermediate government in 
39 democracies. We revisit the structural determinants of government structure, paying special attention 
to the relative influence of the size and population of a country. The notion that countries with larger 
footprints tend to be more decentralized is grounded in the theory of spatial externalities which has pro-
vided a foundation for fiscal federalism. The alternative claim, that more populous countries tend to be 
more decentralized, results from the decrease in the cost of a public good as the number of contributors 
increases.
In the next section, we set out these expectations. We then estimate government structure in order to 
discriminate between them, paying detailed attention to the effects of alternative measurement instru-
ments. We conclude that population is more potent than area in accounting for regional decentralization 
and that more refined measurement can be decisive in assessing competing claims about the structure of 
government.
2. Theorizing Government Structure
2.1 Spatial Theory
Three lines of argument have been used to connect the size of a country with its level of decentralization. 
The first goes under the heading “spatial decay” which describes the increasing costs of communication 
imposed by distance. These costs could include “inefficiency in the provision and delivery of local public 
goods as well as transportation costs” (Arzaghi/Henderson 2005: 1165). If policy provision is subject to 
spatial decay, centralized provision of public goods becomes more wasteful the more distant the region, 
and correspondingly, decentralized provision becomes relatively more efficient. 
The second argument applies the same spatial logic to policy externalities. The larger the footprint of a 
jurisdiction, the less its policy making will affect neighboring jurisdictions, and the smaller the efficiency 
loss arising from policy spillover. The argument informs public goods theory which sets up a trade-off 
between the benefit of adapting policy to particular regions and the loss arising from failure to internalize 
the effects of local decisions for neighboring regions (Alesina/Spolaore 2003; Oates 1972). “Perfect map-
ping” of government structure requires that different government tiers provide efficient levels of outputs 
of public goods whose benefits are “encompassed by the geographical scope of their jurisdictions” (Oates 
2005: 351; Olson 1969). The implication is that the larger a country, the smaller the costs arising from policy 
spillover among regional governments (Oates 2005: 357).
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A third line of argument assumes that larger countries are more heterogeneous, and that as a consequence, 
larger countries decentralize in order to fit policy to the preferences of those living in particular regions 
(Alesina et al. 1995: 754; Breuss 2004: 40; Färber 2001: 112).
Empirical research has confirmed the idea that larger countries are more decentralized. Arzaghi and 
Henderson (2005: 1179) conclude that “[L]and effects are enormous and significant, where greater land 
area and hence spatial dispersion increase the likelihood of being federal. From the base probability of 0.18 
(…) a one-standard deviation in land raises the probability of being federal to 0.60.” Panizza (1999: 113) 
finds that “When more than one measure of size is included in the regression, only Area shows a robust 
correlation with fiscal centralization.” Garrett and Rodden (2003: 97) find that “As expected, countries with 
larger area are significantly more decentralized (…) Population and urbanization have no effect on decen-
tralization in any of the estimations, so we drop them from subsequent analysis.”
2.2 Soft Information Versus Scale Economies
An alternative to spatial theory conceives jurisdictional design as a trade-off between responding appro-
priately to soft information, which favors decentralization, and exploiting scale economies in providing the 
public good, which favors centralization. Both sides of the trade-off are influenced by the number of people 
in the jurisdiction.
The argument that soft information requires decentralization was put on the table by organizational econo-
mists and political scientists who conceive “decision-making for an organization as a process of repeated 
messages or dialogue” (Arrow 1991: 5; Kochen/Deutsch 1969: 735). “We may regard it as close to an 
impossibility for individuals in close contact with the productive processes to transmit their information in 
all its details to another office. This proposition, long recognized in practice, is the basis of the management 
literature on the questions of centralization and decentralization” (Arrow 1961: 11).
Arrow is taking issue with the Fordist notion that the job of front-line personnel is to convey information 
to their superiors who then make investment decisions. Decision making in firms engages persons as well 
as things, and such information may be soft – difficult to standardize, resistant to batching, and corre-
spondingly expensive to pass up an organizational hierarchy. A local bank manager, for example, is better 
positioned to decide on a small-business loan by talking directly with the borrowers to assess their honesty 
and acumen than is a central banker who has access to a report written by the bank manager (Stein 2002: 
1892f).
Government itself can be conceived as a process of repeated dialogue with citizens, and the information 
that is required for the provision of public goods is no less soft than that for small business loans. This mo-
tivates Elinor Ostrom’s (2010: 8) summary of her decades-long contribution to the study of metropolitan 
government:
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“Advocates of the metropolitan reform approach assumed that size of governmental units would always 
be positive for all types of goods and services. Scholars using a political economy approach [by contrast] 
assumed that size of governmental units would be positive or negative depending on the type of public 
good or service. Those involving face-to-face delivery, such as education, policing, and social welfare, 
would show a negative effect of governmental unit size; those involving economies of scale, such as 
highways and utility systems, would show a positive effect.”2
In this conception, the scale of government for public goods requiring “face-to-face delivery” is population 
sensitive. This is the case even if there is no heterogeneity of preferences across localities. The contexts of 
human interaction may vary even if preferences do not. “Street-level” case studies of policy implementa-
tion, beginning with the classic example of the Tennessee Valley Authority, generated a vocabulary to 
describe this – “task environment”, “local interaction”, “local stimuli” (Hodge 1938; Pritchett 1943; Scholz 
et al. 1991).3
To the extent that information is soft, informational costs can be expected to increase with population. The 
larger a group, the more difficult it is to sustain meaningful dialogue: “[T]he need for a minimum message 
length to achieve any use leads to the view that the number of participants in the decision making dialogue 
must be strongly limited (…) The argument becomes even clearer if we take the cost of communication to 
be basically a delay in making the decision.” (Arrow 1991: 6).
One scenario is where there are no economies of scale at all – i.e. a world of soft information where each 
message has to be individually handled (Treisman 2007: 63-69). Minimizing the time delay in communica-
tion between a government and its population requires intermediaries who send and return messages to 
other agents and so on down to each person in the jurisdiction. The delay-minimizing set-up is a hierarchi-
cal network – a system of multi-level governance – where each agent communicates with the same number 
of agents.4 Larger populations require more agents at more intermediate levels.
The number of intermediate government levels under perfectly hard information is, by contrast, zero. If 
there are infinite economies of scale in sending, receiving, and processing messages, then there is no need 
for intervening agents. The ruler communicates directly with the entire population, sending the same mes-
sage to each person, and processing all messages received in a single batch. Such standardization is more 
akin to dictatorship than democracy. However, if preferences can be summarized along a single-peaked 
2 Brackets added.
3 The notion that policy making under soft information demands dialogue between local and central decision mak-
ers underpins social, environmental, research, and educational policy making in the European Union. Sabel and 
Zeitlin (2010) theorize this as “experimentalist” governance: “At the core of these new forms is a recursive process 
of provisional goal-setting and revision through feedback from experience of pursuing them in different contexts. 
Sub-units within and beyond the organization are given substantial responsibility for defining the best ways to 
achieve these goals, separately and in conjunction with one another. They are also responsible for monitoring their 
own operations to find and fix gaps in the ensuing plans as they occur. Their results are then compared against 
one another, to identify and diffuse opportunities for performance improvement. Finally, the goals themselves are 
periodically revised in response to the problems and possibilities revealed by such reviews” (Zeitlin 2010: 2).
4 The number of levels in the hierarchy is the natural logarithm of the population.
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dimension, the ruler can be a computer algorithm producing pareto optimal policy.5 Under perfectly hard 
information, government structure is impervious to population size.
The extent to which soft information requires authoritative decentralization, and not merely deconcentra-
tion, is debated (Hooghe/Marks 2009; Oates 2006; Treisman 2007). In principle, the central state could 
adjust policy to local contexts without empowering subnational actors. There are several possibilities: A 
central legislature could be composed of locally elected representatives who make local policy; the central 
government could appoint or control local agents; or the central government might use local agents to col-
lect and report the relevant information (Besley/Coate 1997; Lockwood 2002; Treisman 2007). This view 
rests on the assumption that information collection does not require discretion, an assumption we can 
evaluate with the data we have generated.
The benefits of decentralization exist in tension with its costs. These arise because the population of a de-
centralized jurisdiction may be too small to reap economies of scale. Decentralization becomes inefficient 
when the per capita cost of centralized provision of the public good is lower than the per capita cost of 
the good provided by each subnational jurisdiction. The fixed per capita cost of a public good is inversely 
related to the population of the jurisdiction that provides it.
Both the benefits and costs of decentralization can be expected to vary across a government’s policy port-
folio. The information necessary for efficient provision of defense or utilities, for example, is chiefly hard, 
whereas that for job retraining, kindergartens, or home care, involves soft information and on-the-job 
appraisal. Similarly, least-cost output in defense, transportation, utilities, and networks will usually require 
large amounts of capital, while that for school systems, hospitals, refuse disposal, welfare provision, and 
policing will require smaller amounts of capital (Ostrom/Ostrom 1971; Ostrom/Parks 1999).
The literatures on the provision of public goods produce plausible, but contrasting implications for gov-
ernment structure. Spatial theory implies that government structure is shaped by the territorial size of a 
country on the grounds that larger countries tend to be more heterogeneous, face greater spatial decay in 
the delivery of public goods, or suffer less from spillovers among subnational governments. An alternative 
view is that a country’s population is decisive. If government structure is determined by a scissors whose 
blades are soft information and per capita cost, one would expect that, irrespective of their footprint or 
preference heterogeneity, countries with larger populations will be more decentralized.
Two inferential challenges lie in wait as we evaluate the validity of these claims. First, we need to estimate 
government structure in a reasonably unbiased way. Second, we must control for contending influences on 
government structure. We tackle these in turn.
5 This is the notion of the social planner (Alesina/Spolaore 2003; Marks/Hooghe 2000).
                            Beyond Federalism | 11
3. Estimating Government Structure
In order to assess the claims set out above, we require a measurement instrument that a) comprehensively 
evaluates the scope of subnational competencies; b) estimates the depth of subnational authority by cod-
ing indirect as well as direct forms of central state control through veto and appointment of subnational 
decision makers; c) encompasses multiple subnational levels of government where they exist; and d) is 
fine-grained enough to estimate variation among unitary countries and among federal countries.
We wish to encompass what is meant by subnational authority, while disaggregating the concept into 
dimensions that can be empirically assessed (Adcock/Collier 2001; Eckstein 1973). The dependent variable 
is the authority exercised within a country by regional government, that is, general purpose government 
at all tiers between local and national government having an average population of 150,000 or more.6 
Regional government distinguishes federal from unitary countries. Whereas all democratic countries have 
authoritative local governments, the authority of intermediate government varies widely across the coun-
tries examined here.
Operationalization of regional authority can draw on a well-established set of concepts. Authority is de-
fined as legitimate power, i. e., power recognized as binding because it is derived from accepted principles 
of governance (Dahl 1968). A regional government has some degree of authority, with respect to some 
territorial jurisdiction, over certain actions. The measure used here therefore specifies (A) the territory 
over which a government exercises authority; (B) the depth of that authority; and (C) the spheres of action 
over which it exercises authority.
With respect to territorial scope of authority (A), a government may exercise authority in its own jurisdic-
tion or co-exercise authority over a larger jurisdiction in which it is part. This is the distinction between self 
rule and shared rule (Elazar 1987) which has wide currency in studies of federalism and regionalization 
(Amoretti/Bermeo 2004; Keating 1998; Lane/Ersson 1999; Watts 1998, 1999; Ziblatt 2006). With respect 
to depth of authority (B), one needs to estimate the degree to which a government has an independent 
legislative, fiscal, and executive organization, the conditions under which it can act unilaterally, and its ca-
pacity to rule when opposed by the national government. With respect to spheres of action (C), a regional 
or international government can have authority over a smaller or broader range of policies. Authority over 
taxation and borrowing, and over constitutional reform are especially important.
These distinctions provide a frame for disaggregating regional authority in the dimensions set out in Table 
1 and detailed in Appendix A and B. These dimensions hold together as a latent variable, which we use in 
the analysis below.
6 Appendix B details the measure and shows that the results reported here are robust when the number of tiers is 
treated as an independent variable or as a control in the model.
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Table 1: Regional Authority Index (RAI)
Self Rule: The authority exercised by a regional government over those who live in the region
Institutional depth The extent to which a regional government is autonomous rather than deconcentrated. 0–3
Policy scope The range of policies for which a regional government is responsible. 0–4
Fiscal autonomy The extent to which a regional government can independently tax its population. 0–4
Representation The extent to which a region is endowed with an independent legislature and executive. 0–4
Shared Rule: The authority exercised by a regional government or its representatives in the country as a whole
Law making The extent to which regional representatives co–determine national legislation. 0–2
Executive control The extent to which a regional government co–determines national policy in 
intergovernmental meetings.
0–2
Fiscal control The extent to which regional representatives co–determine the distribution of national tax 
revenues.
0–2
Constitutional reform The extent to which regional representatives co–determine constitutional change. 0–3
Source: Hooghe, Marks, Schakel (2010).
Table 2: Factor Analysis of Regional Authority
Components Single–factor solution Two–factor solution:
Self-rule               Shared rule
     Institutional depth
     Policy scope
     Fiscal autonomy
     Representation
     Law making
     Executive control
     Fiscal control














           0.96          0.55
           0.96          0.63
           0.83          0.64
           0.95          0.47
           0.54          0.94
           0.68          0.81
           0.55          0.93
           0.55          0.86
           5.46          1.21
82.80
0.59
Note: Principal components factor analysis, oblimin non-orthogonal rotation, listwise deletion; n = 39 (country 
scores for 2006). For the two-factor solution, the highest score for each dimension is in bold. Results for any other 
year in the data set (1950–2006) are similar.
The Cronbach’s alpha across the dimensions described above for 39 countries in 2006 is 0.93 which sug-
gests that they can be interpreted as indicators of a single construct.7 The principal components analysis in 
Table 2 reveals that the eight dimensions are closely associated with the domains of self rule and shared 
rule, but that 68 percent of the variance across the dimensions is shared.
7 The scales are designed to have equivalent intervals. The regression models we use have been shown to be quite 
robust to distortions that could arise from smooth monotone transformations, including summation of ordinal 
scores across rating scales (Shevlin et al. 1997).
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Table 3: Measurement Instruments
Lijphart 
(1999)
36 pre-1996                          • 
democracies
2 time points (1965, 1995)• 
Federalism (1–5). Classification in five categories:
1= unitary and centralized;• 
2= unitary and decentralized;• 
3= semi-federal;• 
4= federal and centralized;• 
5= federal and decentralized• 
Criteria: a) do states “have formally federal constitutions” or not; b) 
are federal or nonfederal states centralized or decentralized (i.e. is 
the range of powers assigned to the regional level large or small); c) 





48 countries with population over • 
10 million
five-year intervals for 1960–1995• 
Federalism (0–4). The fiscal, political, and administrative 
responsibilities of subnational governments averaged across six 
dimensions:
official federal versus unitary government structure (0 or 4) • 
election of a regional executive (0 or 4)• 
election of a local executive (0 or 4) • 
ability of the center to suspend lower levels of government or • 
to override their decisions (0 or 4)
no, limited, full revenue raising authority of lower levels of • 
governments (0, 2 or 4)
revenue sharing (0, 2 or 4)• 
Brancati 
(2006)
30 countries with regional ethnic • 
groups
annual data for 1980–2000• 
Political decentralization (0–5). Vertical division of power among 
multiple levels of government that have independent decision-
making power over at least one issue area:
democratically elected regional legislatures (0 or 1)• 
regional legislatures can raise or levy their own taxes (0 or 1)• 
regional legislatures have joint or exclusive control over • 
education (0 or 1)
regional legislatures have joint or exclusive control over public • 
order or police (0 or 1)
regions approve whether constitutional amendments become • 




3 time points (1975, 1980, 1985)• 
Decentralization ratio (0–100). Calculated as 100 minus fiscal 
centralization ratio which is central government revenues as 
percentage of total public sector revenues (IMF data).
Stegarescu
(2005)
23 OECD democracies• 
annual data for 1965-2001• 
Fiscal autonomy (0–100). Autonomous sub-central tax revenues 
as percentage of total government tax revenues, excluding social 
security revenues and taxes paid to the EU (OECD data).
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Note: Countries listed are those for which we have Regional Authority scores and data for all independent variables 
in the Appendix.
Table 3 summarizes alternative measurement instruments, and Table 4 lists the countries that each instru-
ment has in common with the Regional Authority Index. The most cited measure is Lijphart’s “Federal/
Unitary dimension” which he uses to test hypotheses about consensual versus Westminster democracy. 
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The measure has three intermediate categories that contain ten of the 36 country-year observations 
(Lijphart 1999: 186-95). Figure 1 matches observations in the Lijphart and Regional Authority Index for 
1995 and Table 5 lists cases where Regional Authority Index scores diverge more than two standard devia-
tions from those of alternative measures.
Figure 1: Lijphart and Regional Authority Estimates
Note: Estimates (z-scores) for 24 countries common to the Lijphart dataset and Regional Authority Index in 1995.
Table 5: Regressing the Regional Authority Index on Alternative Instruments






Extent of authority for new and directly elected 
tier
Extent of authority for new and directly elected 
tier
Arzaghi-Henderson  +2.10 Poland 1990, 1995 Extent of central control over regional tier
Brancati  –2.37 to –3.08 Belgium 1989–2000 Reform of policy, tax, and constitutional veto 
powers for regions & communities
Panizza  –2.40 to –2.48 Belgium 1980, 1985 Fiscal revenues vs. political authority
Stegarescu  –2.36 to –2.44
 –2.29 to –2.31
Belgium 1989–1994 
Germany 1973–2001
Autonomous taxes vs. political authority 
Autonomous taxes vs. political authority
Note: Cases listed are those for which the residuals of regressing the Regional Authority Index on an alternative 
measure are equal or greater than two standard deviations. A negative sign indicates that the estimate of the 
alternative measure is smaller than the estimate of the Regional Authority Index.
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The greatest differences with Lijphart are for Italy and France, which shift markedly in the Regional Authority 
Index between 1965 and 1995, but little in the Lijphart dataset. Italy created a new regional tier, regioni, in 
1972 with directly elected councils and competencies in urban planning, health, and education. In France, 
Napoleonic départements gained authority in 1982 when the powers of centrally appointed prefects were 
transferred to the presidents of directly elected département councils.
There is also some divergence at the top end of the scale. All but one of the seven federal regimes identified 
by Lijphart in 1995 score the maximum, while estimates range between 18 (Austria) and 29.3 (Germany) 
on the Regional Authority Index. Austria and Germany are both federal polities, but there are some sharp 
contrasts. In contrast to German Länder, Austrian Länder have little authority over national legislation or 
over the base or rate of regional taxes. Furthermore, decentralization in Germany does not stop at the 
Länder, but encompasses a second tier of Kreise.
Arzaghi-Henderson estimate considerably more decentralization in Poland for 1990 and 1995 than does 
the Regional Authority Index. At issue is the difference between decentralization and deconcentration. 
Regional governments in Poland were downgraded in 1990 to central outposts and direct elections were 
reinstated only in 1999 (Council of Europe 2000: 47f; Schakel 2008: 156). Brancati (2008) registers no 
change in Belgium from 1985 to 2000, whereas the Regional Authority Index spikes up in 1989 when Belgian 
regions and communities obtained broader policy competencies, taxation powers, and shared rule.
Panizza (1999) and Stegarescu (2005) use measures of fiscal decentralization based on IMF and OECD 
statistics. These data estimate subnational receipts as a share of total government receipts. Panizza has 
estimates for 1975, 1980, and 1985, while Stegarescu’s slightly different fiscal measure provides an annual 
time series from 1965 to 2001. Our scores differ more than two standard deviations from those of Panizza 
for Belgium, and in the case of Stegarescu, also for Germany. In both countries, regional governments 
exert considerable authority, but this is not indicated by their fiscal take. Belgian regions and communities 
came to exercise broad-ranging legal and constitutional powers after 1989, but fiscal decentralization was 
blocked until 1995. German Länder exchanged tax autonomy for shared rule in 1966 and are among the 
most authoritative subnational governments in any democracy.
Figure 2 maps the Stegarescu estimates against those of the Regional Authority Index for 1999, the latest 
year with estimates for the maximum number of countries shared between the indices. The further north 
a country in Figure 2, the greater is its share of government revenue. Sweden and Japan are placed above 
the United States; Denmark and Finland above Belgium and Australia; and every one of these countries 
above Germany. None of these comparisons accord with the literature on subnational government in these 
countries . Fiscal measures have been used to good effect in studies of fiscal federalism (Boadway/Shah 
2009; Rodden 2006), but they are inappropriate as measures of political decentralization (Rodden 2004; 
Schakel 2008; Sorens 2010).
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Figure 2: Fiscal Decentralization
Note: Estimates (z-scores) for 23 countries common to the Stegarescu dataset and Regional Authority Index for 1999. 
4. Explaining Government Structure
We measure area and population of a country on a logarithmic scale because the expected effect of an 
additional person or square kilometers declines as absolute population or territory increases. In order to 
estimate their causal effects we exert the following controls (see Appendix A for details).
Ethnicity. Subnational communities – bounded groups of densely interacting humans sharing distinctive 
norms – are considered a magnet for regional authority. Ethnic communities often have distinct policy pref-
erences. Rokkan and Urwin (1983) suggest that culturally peripheral communities are predisposed to resist 
centralization and demand self-rule (Gellner 1983). Additionally, government is hypothesized to work best 
when it encompasses communities that “can draw on a reservoir of common cultural materials – language, 
experience, understandings about modes of interactions – that makes it easier for community members to 
communicate and work together” (Deutsch 1966; Habyarimana et al. 2007: 711).
Inequality. One expectation is that relatively rich regions will demand greater fiscal autonomy and poor 
regions will demand centralized redistribution (Bolton/Roland 1997; Dahl Fitjar 2008; Van Houten 2003). 
Alternatively, poor regions may prefer decentralization if their optimal fiscal policy differs substantially 
from that of the country as a whole (Alesina/Spolaore 2003: 63-67). Beramendi (2010) argues that poor 
regions with distinctive labor markets may want decentralization to implement appropriate labor market 
policies. The available data do not allow us to model the interaction of regional inequality with regional 
fiscal or labor market variables over time, but we are able to observe the standard deviation of mean per 
capita income across regions in 39 countries.
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Affluence. Laitin (1998) argues that citizens in richer countries may be willing to pay the costs of regional 
government to preserve cultural and linguistic diversity. Also, the policy portfolios of governments in richer 
countries may include a larger share of public goods that are efficiently delivered at the regional level 
(Osterkamp/Eller 2003; Peterson 1995).
Democracy. Democracies are considered to be more responsive than autocracies to demands for regional-
ization on account of their openness to societal pressures for self rule (Hooghe et al. 2010; Meguid 2009)
Regional political parties. Regional political parties press for greater regional authority.8 While regional 
political parties rarely form governments, a regional party may precipitate regional reform as a pivot or 
by inducing a party in government to steal its thunder (Hopkin/Van Houten 2009; Sorens 2009; Swenden/
Maddens 2009).
5. Results
The first column of Table 6 models Population and Area under controls. Whereas Area does not reach sig-
nificance, Population has a large and significant effect on Regional Authority. Subsequent columns impose 
robustness tests. The second column reports a measure of multicollinearity, the variance inflation factor 
(VIF). Multicollinearity inflates the standard errors, making it harder to assess the independent effect of a 
variable.9 A VIF < 3 is regarded as low, but it is still the case that because Area is associated with Population 
(R=0.69) and Inequality (R=0.24), its standard error is larger than it would be if it were uncorrelated with 
these variables. The inflation of the standard error for Area is √1.98= 1.41 which produces a VIF-adjusted 
standard error of 1.22⁄1.41= 0.87 . If Area were to share none of its variance with the other independent 
variables, the estimate for its effect on Regional Authority still fails to reach significance (t-value = 1.43). 
The VIF-adjusted t-value for Population is 4.18.
8 Granger tests indicate that the causality runs from regionalist political party representation to regional authority. 
However, this cannot be generalized to party systems, for as Chhibber and Kollman (2004: 79) observe, “party 
systems become more national as governments centralize authority.”
9 The VIF for independent variable j is 1/(1 − Rj2), where Rj2 is the squared multiple correlation from a regression 
of variable j on all other independent variables in the model. The VIFj is proportional to the variance of variable j 
explained by the other independent variables in the model. On VIF see O’Brien (2007).
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Regional parties  15.26***
(4.23)






















Note: Non-standardized beta coefficients; robust standard errors clustered on country are listed in parentheses. *** 
p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10.
I Annual scores for 1950 to 2006 across 39 democracies. Scores are calculated for each dimension at each regional 
tier and next aggregated to the country level weighted by population.
The final columns of Table 6 estimate a lagged endogenous variable model and a jackknife test. Both tests 
indicate that Population is significant in explaining Regional Authority and that Area fails to reach signifi-
cance. Controlling for past levels of Regional Authority minimizes concern that the association between 
Population and Regional Authority is spurious. The estimates for Population and Area are robust when 
we delete individual countries from the analysis.10 The analysis also confirms the significance of regional 
parties, democracy, ethnicity, and affluence. All trail population except for regional parties, but population 
comes out ahead when comparing VIF-adjusted t-values.
10 The strong and significant effect of population is robust when we control for urbanization. To the extent that it is 
easier to coordinate public goods provision in densely populated areas, urbanization should reduce the effect of 
population on regional decentralization (Arzaghi/Henderson 2005). We test both the independent effect of urban-
ization and its interaction with population, but detect no significant effects (results obtainable from the authors).
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Figure 3 estimates the effect of population on regional authority using Clarify. Uncertainty associated with 
the expected values of Regional Authority is greatest at the extremes. A country with a population of five 
million has an expected Regional Authority Index between 7.1 and 9.7 within a 95 percent confidence band, 
with an average 8.4 as our best guess. This would, for example, be a country in which regional governments 
have indirectly elected assemblies that appoint regional executives with the power to set the rate of minor 
taxes and exercise competences, subject to central veto, in economic and welfare policy. A country with 
a population of 50 million has a mean expected Regional Authority Index of 14.1 (within a 95 percent 
confidence band of 9.8 to 18.2). Regional governments in this country might then have elected assemblies, 
broader policy competencies not subject to central veto, power to set the base as well as the rate of minor 
taxes, and some role in national decision making, for example, by designating representatives to a second 
legislative chamber or by meeting routinely with the central government.  
Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Population on Regional Authority
Note: Marginal effect of Population on Regional Authority within 5–95% confidence bands. The vertical lines indicate, 
from left to right, populations one standard deviation below the mean (1.35 million, e.g. Estonia), the mean 
population (8.6 million, e.g. Sweden), and one standard deviation above the mean (48 million, e.g. Italy or France in 
the 1960s), respectively.  
Lijphart (1999: 252), quoting Dahl and Tufte (1973), anticipates that a country’s location on the unitary/fed-
eral dimension is related to population size, but this is difficult to detect when countries are categorized as 
unitary or federal. Countries that Lijphart codes as unitary (Figure 4: lower ellipse) and as federal (Figure 4: 
higher ellipse) vary quite a lot in the Regional Authority Index. The variation is particularly sharp among the 
unitary countries. Iceland, for example, has a level of intermediate government (landsvæðun) that exists 
only as a statistical category. Greece, by contrast, has a regional tier consisting of 54 prefectures (nomoi) 
which, from 1994 on, were run by directly elected councils and a council-selected prefect. Councils have 
competence over primary education, hospitals, roads, and transport. Central oversight remains extensive, 
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and prefects continue to double as central state agents in urban planning and sanitation. New Zealand, 
which also has the minimum score in the left-hand figure, has 16 regions run by directly elected councils 
that can set the base and rate of property taxes and which are responsible for public transport, environ-
mental policy, including air, land and marine pollution, as well as river and coastal management.
Figure 4: The Federal/Unitary Straightjacket
Note: Estimates for the 24 countries common to the Lijphart dataset and Regional Authority Index (RAI) for 1995.
Measurement can be decisive in assessing causality. This is revealed in Table 7 which compares results for 
common samples using different estimates of the dependent variable. The first column runs the model for 
all observations in Lijphart’s dataset. The second column replaces Lijphart’s measure with the Regional 
Authority Index for the same set of cases. As one would suspect from Figure 4, Population is insignificant as 
a predictor using Lijphart’s measure and significant when using the Regional Authority Index.
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Lijphart            RAI Arzaghi                    RAI
-Henderson   
Brancati           RAI Panizza          RAI Stegar-                 RAI
escu
Population  0.50    6.39* *
(0.94)               (2.43)
 5.01*                    –0.02
(2.36)                     (2.74)
 0.77                      4.13
(0.53)                  (3.28)
 –6.79                  5.78*
(5.33)                (3.04)
 –2.99                 5.21**
(5.45)                  (2.24)
Area  0.36                     0.56
(0.34)               (1.22)
 4.60***              4.61*** 
(0.88)                     (1.32)
 0.20                      1.98
(0.36)                  (2.34) 
 7.69**                0.30
(2.73)                (1.57)
 8.56**                  1.19
(3.73)                  (1.27)
Ethnicity  2.08                 10.51*
(1.67)               (5.15)
 0.39                       –1.78
(2.87)                    (4.32)
 2.02**          13.44***
(0.74)                  (3.77)
 22.02                   7.38
(14.31)             (5.28)
35.79*          11.50***
(18.49)               (3.94)
Inequality 0.59                   –0.61 
(2.43)               (8.39)
 –15.39                  12.49
(11.57)                (12.98) 
 3.36                      9.41
(1.95)                  (9.61)
 29.18          9.95
(29.39)           (14.04)
 –24.11                11.12
(29.79)               (9.26)
Affluence  –0.07                  1.27
(0.22)               (1.18)
 1.76                       2.53**
(1.35)                     (1.17)
 0.81                   9.16**
(0.61)                 (3.98)
 13.89**              4.85
(5.60)                (3.76)
 4.25                 4.49***
(3.09)                  (1.51)
Democracy 0.81***          3.67**
(0.26)               (1.03)
 1.47**                  2.03**
(0.53)                     (0.74)
 0.28***            1.26**
(0.09)                  (0.47)
 1.17                     1.20
(1.36)                (1.12)
 4.80                 2.84***
(2.86)                  (1.00)
Regional 
parties
 1.35               12.29**
(1.20)               (3.48)
54.25*                   90.37*
(29.29)                (44.42)
 –1.24               11.75**
(0.91)                  (5.09)
 –32.63**           9.36
(14.61)             (7.04)
 −11.29            10.71**
(20.39)               (4.05)
Constant  –12.21          –87.10
(4.70)             (19.80)
 –57.18                –37.20
(14.82)                (15.50)
 –11.24              –82.21
(5.34)                (30.09) 
–26.10              –66.29
(34.65)           (22.36)
 −56.31             –85.86
(49.01)             (17.40)
R2
F test
0.45         0.67
32.92**     29.74***
0.76               0.64
122.50***      35.89***
0.71            0.82
9.53*** 119.64***
0.46         0.65
8.33*** 19.50***
0.39           0.66
5.83***  55.38***
Note: Non-standardized beta coefficients; robust standard errors clustered on country are listed in parentheses. *** 
p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10.
Subsequent columns pair alternative instruments with the Regional Authority Index. Estimates for 
Population are insignificant while those for Area are significant for both the Arzaghi-Henderson measure 
and for the Regional Authority Index. The result appears to be driven by the sample which is limited to 16 
countries with a population greater than 10 million. These include Australia, Canada, and the United States 
which are vast and decentralized. The regression line connects these countries and the remaining ones. 
There is no association between Area and Regional Authority for the three English-speaking countries, and 
the association for the remaining 13 countries is weakly negative.
Brancati selects countries to maximize variation on ethnic groups. This works well for her purpose, which is 
to evaluate the effect of decentralization on ethnic conflict (Brancati 2006, 2008), but produces estimates 
that are sensitive to outlying cases in the sample shared with the Regional Authority Index. A panel jack-
knife dropping individual countries produces insignificant estimates for all independent variables.
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Fiscal federalism measures, including those used by Panizza (1999) and Stegarescu (2005), confirm Area 
and disconfirm Population (final columns of Table 7). When we use the Regional Authority Index for the 
same set of cases, we find precisely the reverse. A possible explanation is that the allocation of taxation 
across levels of government is peculiarly sensitive to territorial spillover on the ground that a local tax will 
be suboptimal if non-residents living in a neighboring town use city services for which they are not taxed 
(Blöchliger/King 2006).
The evidence presented here asks us to think again about the spatial hypothesis for the structure of subna-
tional government. While the arguments set out above linking area to government structure are plausible, 
their causal power is debatable. The first, spatial decay, explains decentralization as a cost of communica-
tion which is held to depend on distance. However, the reduction of communication costs since 1950 has 
not had the anticipated effect of increasing political centralization.11 Moreover, larger countries are not 
much more heterogeneous than small countries. The much-cited analyses of Panizza (1999) and Alesina 
and Spolaore (2003) are based on models in which distance from the center (or capital) of a country is a 
proxy for preference heterogeneity. However, the association between country size and the Fearon (2003) 
measure of ethnic diversity across 39 democracies and quasi-democracies is just 0.078 (sig = 0.62). It is 
true that vast former colonies became home to diverse groups of immigrants, but these countries have 
high rates of geographical mobility, and as a result, they have few territorial minorities. By contrast, many 
European countries, despite their small area, contain territorial minorities with distinctive languages and 
cultures. 
6. Conclusion
In recent years there has been renewed concern with the effect of measurement error on valid infer-
ence about political attitudes (Ansolabehere et al. 2008), ethnic conflict (Baldwin/Huber 2010), democracy 
(Coppedge et al. 2008), political parties (Bakker et al. forthcoming; Marks et al. 2007) – to list but a few 
topics raised in recently published articles. Forty years ago, Blalock (1970: 1105) identified one of the chief 
problems:
“A very common practice whenever measurement is clearly recognized as being crude is to resort to a 
relatively small number of ordered categories. In the extreme case the analyst may use dichotomies 
in order to simplify his analysis. It may not be recognized that such very simple procedures produce 
both random and nonrandom measurement errors that become increasingly serious as the number of 
categories is reduced.”
11 In a paper written in the 1950s, Herbert Simon and his co-authors hypothesized that long-distance telephony 
makes it “unnecessary” for governments “to allow representatives much discretion” and that “improved methods 
of communication have made a much greater degree of centralization possible” (Simon et al. 1956: 275; 279). Of 
the 39 countries dealt with here, only Sweden and Germany have become more centralized since 1950, while 29 
have become more regionalized.
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This article has argued that this is precisely the case in the study of government. The contrast between 
unitary and federal government is fundamental, yet it appears to have straight-jacketed efforts to estimate 
variation across time and space. It directs our attention to the rare event of constitutional choice, but away 
from reforms that do not shift a country from one category to the other. By conceiving government struc-
ture in dichotomous terms, the unitary/federal distinction is insensitive to change and overly sensitive to 
the creation of federal regimes in former British colonies.
Researchers who wish to measure government structure have added intermediate categories or they have 
used fiscal data on the share of subnational tax receipts or spending as an indicator of subnational author-
ity. This is error-prone because a government’s fiscal envelope can be a poor guide to its capacity to decide 
how it spends.
The measurement instrument used here is grounded on the distinction between self rule and shared rule 
made by federalism scholars themselves. We estimate self rule and shared rule along eight dimensions de-
signed to tap the institutional depth of regional governments, the scope of their policy competencies, their 
role in law making, their executive capacity, representation, fiscal control, and constitutional powers. The 
instrument is sensitive to variation among federal regimes and among unitary regimes as well as between 
them, and we find that the population of a country is more consequential for government structure than 
its area. We also confirm the anticipated effects of cultural heterogeneity, democracy, and affluence on 
decentralization.
The population finding is consistent with the argument that government is shaped by a tension between 
centralization, which reduces the per capita cost of a public good, and decentralization, which facilitates 
dialogue between government and citizens (Arrow 1961; Deutsch 1966; Kochen/Deutsch 1969; Treisman 
2007: 55-69).
The area hypothesis is consistent with the fact that federal countries, which include the United States, 
Australia, and Canada, are on average much larger than unitary countries. However, the association be-
tween area and government structure disappears when we estimate variation in decentralization among 
non-federal countries. Finland, France, Japan, Spain, and Sweden, for example, are similarly sized, but have 
contrasting levels of decentralization. Because it diminishes variation within each category, the unitary/
federalism distinction is overly sensitive to the creation of federal regimes in the large spaces that were 
once British colonies and insensitive to variation at the other end of the scale.
Why should one care that the population of a country rather than its area is consequential for its govern-
ment? A country’s footprint is an inert object fixed for decades or even centuries, but its population is alive 
and changeable. The causal mechanism by which area affects government structure, spillover, depends 
on distance. The causal mechanism by which population affects government structure, soft information, 
depends on the benefit of dialogue in producing public policy. While we know less about soft information 
than we know about distance, the line of theorizing pursued in this article may draw on – and perhaps 
contribute to – theories of democracy and participation.
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The finding concerning the effect of population raises fundamental questions about how we should explain 
the structure of government. The size of a country’s population is a structural factor that lies far back, and 
perhaps at the very beginning, in the causal chain leading to political decisions about the creation of a new 
level of government or the allocation of authority across existing levels. There is much to learn about the 
mechanisms. How does the functional pressure of population and the demand for soft information get 
translated into the political pressures that shape decision making? Attempts to answer this question will 
need to connect theories of party competition and public policy with accurate estimation of government 
structure. By carefully bringing more information to bear on the dependent variable, our purpose is to 
produce more valid estimates of causal effects, and ultimately better theory.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Operationalization of Independent Variables (Tables 6 & 7)
Population Annual figures in ‘000s, log10. Source: Penn World Table 6.3 (Heston et al. 2009).
Area Annual figures in ‘000 km2, log10. Source: Penn World Table 6.3 (Heston et al. 2009).
Ethnicity The probability that two individuals selected at random from the country’s population will be from 
different ethnic groups. Denoting population shares of ethnic groups in a country as p1, p2, p3. . . , 
pn, the ethnic fractionalization index is 
Fearon’s estimate provides one time point for the postwar period. Only countries where ethnic 
difference is mostly or wholly territorially concentrated according to the Minorities at Risk dataset 
(2009) receive a value different from zero. Source: Fearon (2003); available on http://www.stanford.
edu/~jfearon/ (accessed March 2011).
Inequality Coefficient of variation (CV) of regional GDP per capita. The measure is standardized and calculated 
as follows:
where yi  is the income per capita of region i, N is the number of regions, and is the mean per 
capita GRDP (unweighted by population) in a country:
There is no single year for which data are publically available for all countries. We use 2000 or 
nearest year to score 39 countries.
Source: Regional GDP per capita data from Eurostat website for EU-27, Croatia and Macedonia 
(accessed in March 2011); OECD data for non-EU democracies (accessed in March 2011); Russia 
from Benini and Czyzewski (2007). For a discussion of the coefficient of variation and other 
measures of regional inequality, see Shankar and Shah (2001).
Affluence Annual real gross domestic product per capita, current price. Log10. Source: Penn World Table 6.3 
(Heston et al. 2009).
Democracy Freedom House index for each country-year since 1972. Values estimated by the authors prior to 
1972. The index sums scores for political rights and civil liberties on 7-point scales from 1=most 
democratic to 7=least democratic. Recoded so that high values indicate more democracy. Source: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org (accessed in March 2011).
Regional parties Proportion of seats in the national parliament for regional parties on an annual basis. Non-election 
years take on the value of the most recent election year prior. A party is regional when it has an 
exclusively regional electoral base. Source: Party list provided by Arjan H. Schakel and updated by 
the authors.
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics
Measure/Variable Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Measures of Regional Authority
Institutional Depth 2.08 1.48 0 5.76
Policy Scope 1.68 1.58 0 5.00
Fiscal Autonomy 1.41 1.55 0 4.94
Representation 2.77 2.29 0 7.97
Law Making 0.43 0.68 0 2.00
Executive Control 0.31 0.60 0 2.00
Fiscal Control 0.40 0.71 0 3.00
Constitutional Reform 0.80 1.34 0 5.98
Independent Variables
Population 6.96 0.75 5.16 8.48
Area 2.21 0.93 –0.50 4.23
Ethnicity 0.12 0.20 0.02 0.60
Inequality 0.24 0.13 0.00 0.62
Affluence 3.82 0.47 2.42 4.82
Democracy 12.1 1.60 3.00 13.00
Regional Parties 0.03 0.12 0.00 1.00
Table A.3: Correlation Table for the Measures of Regional Authority
ID PS FA R LM EC FC CR
Institutional Depth 1
Policy Scope .88 1
Fiscal Autonomy .74 .85 1
Representation .93 .87 .73 1
Law Making .60 .61 .62 .54 1
Executive Control .63 .75 .60 .58 .67 1
Fiscal Control .50 .52 .44 .43 .73 .52 1
Constitutional Reform .58 .60 .59 .52 .71 .50 .80 1
Note: N=1603. ID=Institutional Depth; PS=Policy Scope; FA=Fiscal Autonomy; R=Representation; LM=Law Making; 
EC=Executive Control; FC=Fiscal Control; CR=Constitutional Reform.
32 | KFG Working Paper No. 37 | April 2012 
Table A.4: Countries, Start of Measurement (through 2006), Minimum, Mean, Maximum Value on Regional Authority 
Index
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Appendix B: Measuring Regional Authority
The instrument evaluates individual tiers of government (or individual regions in asymmetric arrangements 
or with a special autonomous statute) on an annual basis across eight dimensions of regional authority. 
Primary sources (constitutions, legislation, statutes) are triangulated with secondary literature and con-
sultation of country experts to achieve reliable and valid estimates. This study encompasses all levels of 
government below the national level with an average population greater than 150,000 in 39 democracies 
(Table A.4) over the period 1950-2006. Individual regions that have a special statute are included even if 
they do not meet the population criterion.
The coding scheme below (see also Table 1) sets out the eight dimensions that constitute the latent vari-
able of regional government. Table 2 reports the principal components analysis which reveals that the eight 
dimensions are closely associated with the domains of self rule and shared rule, but that 68 percent of the 




Four categories are distinguished. The first is a null category where there is no functioning general-purpose 
regional administration. The second is described by the Napoleonic term, déconcentration, which refers 
to a regional administration that is hierarchically subordinate to central government. A deconcentrated 
regional administration has the paraphernalia of self governance – buildings, personnel, a budget – but is a 
central government outpost. The final two categories distinguish among regional administrations that exer-
cise meaningful authority. The more self-governing a regional government, the more its relationships with 
the central government are lateral rather than hierarchical. The fundamental distinction here is whether-
regional self-government is, or is not, subject to central government veto (Falleti 2010; Inman 2008).
 Institutional Depth
0: no functioning general-purpose administration at the regional level;
1: deconcentrated, general-purpose, administration;
2: non-deconcentrated, general–purpose, administration subject to central government veto;
3: non-deconcentrated, general–purpose, administration not subject to central government veto.
2) Policy Scope
This dimension is concerned with regional authority over policy making (Brancati 2006; Keating 2001; 
Peterson 1995; Sorens 2010). Policies are grouped into five areas: economic, cultural-educational, welfare, 
constitutive and coercive policies (residual powers, police, own institutional set-up, local government), and 
immigration and citizenship. Regional governments are scored on whether they exercise authority in none, 
one, or more than one of the first four policy areas. The final policy category taps whether a regional 
government co-exercises authority over membership in its community, i.e. in immigration and citizenship 
policies.
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 Policy Scope
0: very weak authoritative competencies;
1: authoritative competencies in a), b), c) or d) 
                      a) economic policy;
                      b) cultural-educational policy; 
                      c) welfare policy; 
                      d) one of the following: residual powers, police, own institutional set–up, local government
2: authoritative competencies in at least two of a), b), c), or d);
3: authoritative competencies in d) and at least two of a), b), or c);
4: region meets the criteria for 3 plus authority over immigration or citizenship.
3) Fiscal Autonomy
Fiscal autonomy is evaluated in terms of a regional government’s authority to set the base and rate of 
minor and major taxes in its jurisdiction (OECD 1999; Rodden 2004; Schakel 2008). A schema developed 
by the OECD (1999), which distinguishes two notions of authority (control independent from central gov-
ernment, and shared rule with central government), and three areas of control (base, rate, revenue split), 
is drawn on to develop a simplified schema that produces (a) an annual (not decennial) measure, (b) for 
particular levels of government (not aggregated across subnational levels) that (c) is conceptually close to 
the thing to be measured: i.e., authority on fiscal matters. We assess a regional government’s tax portfolio 
as a whole by distinguishing between major and minor taxes and within these, between the capacity to 
control base and rate, or rate only.
 Fiscal Autonomy
0: the central government sets the base and rate of all regional taxes;
1: the regional government sets the rate of minor taxes;
2: the regional government sets the base and rate of minor taxes;
3: the regional government sets the rate of at least one major tax: personal income, corporate,        
                      corporate, value added, sales tax;      
4: the regional government sets the base and rate of at least one major tax.
4) Representation 
Regional authority with respect to representation is conceived as the capacity of regional actors to select 
regional office holders: in the case of legislators, by indirect election by subnational office holders or by 
direct election in the region; in the case of an executive, by a mixed system of a regional/central dual execu-
tive or a regional assembly.  
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 Assembly
0: the region has no regional assembly;
1: the region has an indirectly elected regional assembly;
2: the region has a directly elected assembly.
 Executive
0: the regional executive is appointed by central government;
1: dual executive appointed by central government and the regional assembly;
2: the executive is appointed by a regional assembly or is directly elected.
B) SHARED RULE
The index distinguishes four avenues for regional participation in national decision making. A region may 
participate in making national law through its representation in the national legislature, usually in the up-
per chamber. A regional government may share executive responsibility with the national government for 
implementing policy. A region may co-determine the distribution of tax revenues in the country as a whole. 
Finally, and most importantly, a regional government may exercise authority over the constitutional set up 
in the country or, in the case of a special autonomous region, over its own constitutional relationship with 
the center.
1) Law Making
Law making assesses a) the role of regions in structuring representation at the national level (i.e. in the 
second legislative chamber); b) whether regional governments are directly represented in the second 
chamber; c) whether regions have majority or minority representation there; and d) the legislative scope 
of the second chamber.
 Law Making
0.5 for each of the following characteristics:
regions are the unit of representation in the legislature, i.e. the distribution of representation determined by regional weights, • 
rather than ‘one citizen, one vote’ in the country as a whole;
regional governments designate representatives in the legislature;• 
regions at a given level have majority representation in the legislature;• 
a legislature with regional representation has extensive legislative authority, i.e. can veto ordinary legislation or can be over-• 
ridden only by a supermajority in the other chamber
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2) Executive Control
Executive control taps the possibility that regional executives have routine meetings with the central gov-
ernment and whether these are advisory or have veto power (Wright 1988). To score positively on this 
scale, such meetings must be routinized, not ad hoc, and to score the maximum, such meetings must be 
authoritative – they must reach decisions that formally bind the participants.
 Executive Control
0: no routine meetings between central government and regional governments to negotiate    
                      policy;
1: routine meetings between central government and regional governments without legally bind    
                      ing authority;
2: routine meetings between central government and regional governments with authority to  
                      reach legally binding decisions.
3) Fiscal Control
This refers to the role of regions in negotiating or, at the extreme, exerting a veto, over the territorial distri-
bution of national tax revenues. Shared rule on taxation is a special case of legislative or executive shared 
rule. Yet fiscal extraction and allocation are consequential enough to be considered separately. Regional 
governments may influence the distribution of national tax revenues, including intergovernmental grants, 
directly in the context of intergovernmental meetings, or indirectly via representatives in a legislature with 
regional governmental representation.
 Fiscal control
0: regional governments or their representatives in the legislature are not consulted over the distribution of tax  
                      revenues;
1: regional governments or their representatives in the legislature negotiate over the distribution of tax revenues, but  
                      do  not have a veto;
2: regional governments or their representatives in the legislature have a veto over the distribution of tax revenues.
4) Constitutional Reform
Constitutional reform assesses authority over the rules of the game (Amoretti 2004; Bednar 2009; Watts 
1998). The schema distinguishes between regional actors (i.e. electorates or regionally elected represen-
tatives) and regional governments. Since the purpose of the measure is to assess the extent of regional 
government authority, the role of the latter is given more weight than that of the former. So the questions 
asked are whether the central government or a unitary national electorate can unilaterally reform the 
constitution; do they need the assent of regional electorates or their representatives; or must reform gain 
the cooperation or assent of regional governments?
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 Constitutional Reform
0: the central government and/or national electorate can unilaterally change the constitution;
1: a legislature on the principle of regional representation must approve constitutional change; or constitutional change  
                      requires a referendum based on equal regional representation (i.e. approval in a majority of regions);
2: regional governments are a directly represented majority in a legislature     which can do one or more of the following:
                      - postpone constitutional reform
                      - introduce amendments
                      - raise the decision hurdle in the other chamber
                      - require a second vote in the other chamber
                      - require a popular referendum
3: a majority of regional governments can veto constitutional change.
Regional Tiers
Country scores are obtained by aggregating scores for each regional tier in a country.
The first two columns of the table below model the Regional Authority Index with the Number of Tiers 
included as a control. Despite the strong association between Population and Number of Tiers (r = 0.67), 
Population retains significance, and is the most significant variable when its high VIF is taken into account. 
The third column treats the number of tiers as the dependent variable and shows that Population and 
Regional Parties are significantly associated with the number of tiers under controls.
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Table B.1: Robustness Analysis: Number of Tiers as Independent and Dependent Variable
Dep Var  — Regional Authority Index
                                                 VIF
                      Number of Tiers
Population  3.37                                      3.40
(1.88)
                              0.65
                            (0.18)
Area  1.41                                      1.99
(1.19)
                           –0.05
                            (0.08)
Ethnicity  10.89                                   1.27
(4.67)
                             0.17
                            (0.31)
Inequality  –3.43                                   1.75
(5.26)
                           –0.14
                            (0.54)
Affluence  1.45                                     1.12
(0.78)
                             0.10
                            (0.07)
Democracy  1.32                                     1.25
(0.33)
                             0.04
                            (0.03)
Regional parties  11.26                                  1.41
(3.34)
                             1.13
                            (0.35)
Number of tiers  3.55                                    2.11
(2.01)
                               —
   Constant  –42.59                               —
(12.49)
                            –4.29







                                              1.79
                1603 (39)
                              0.53
                             14.72***
                            1603 (39)
Note: Non-standardized beta coefficients, robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses.
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